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APPELLANT'S DISPUTATION, "CORRECTION" AND REBUTTAL
OF STATE-MISCHARACTERIZED "FACTS"

A.

Contrary to the State's assertion [p. iii of BRIEF OF
(of

APPELLEE]

"no

prior

appeals"

paraphrased)],

the

Defendant's underlying criminal conviction was appealed to
and decided by the Utah Court of Appeals in 2008. State vs
Garcia, 2009 UT App 384,

(unpublished memorandum decision),

24 December 2009. See RECORD at 108-112.

B.

Contrary to the State's assertion [page 5, line 7 of

BRIEF OF APPELLEE (of Defendant's "conviction on a plea of
guilty")], the Defendant was actually tried and convicted
following a

one-day jury trial.

See RECORD at 81:

JURY

VERDICT document.
C.

The State engages in a misleading "play on words" in

its sentence [page 5, lines 12-13] that
"At no time during the criminal proceedings did
defendant challenge the restitution amount listed
in the [pre-sentence] report."
Bracketed word "pre-sentence II added for clarity. The phrase
"restitution amount" is intentionally misleading, for the
simple reason that the May 2008 pre-sentence report simply
did

not

"recommend"

any

"restitution".

The

report

acknowledged the State agency's (Utah Office of Crime Victim
Restitution)
expenses 11
that

;

claim

to

have

paid

$7,000

for

"funeral

arguably, the statement- - - i.e. agency's assertion

$7,000

was

paid

(paraphrased)---was

a

truthful

statement, for which no rebuttal was necessary, especially
when no "restitution" was actually "recommended" against
3
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GARCIA.

D.

As noted in Part

below,

II of

the Reply Argument

the State's characterization [page 5,

following]
the $7,

ooo

section

line 14 and

of the "initial hearing" discussion concerning
is distorted and misleading.

See Part

II of

Appellant's Reply Argument discussion.
E.

The

October

2011

"letter",

written

by

the

Board's

Senior Hearing Officer in specific response to GARCIA' s
familymembers' letter concerning "restitution", is correctly
quoted [page 6 of BRIEF OF APPELLEE] but for a misleading
and incorrect conclusion. IF---the "big IF"---the Board had
"ordered" GARCIA to make "restitution" a year earlier, the
"letter" would have clearly said so, rather than the "thank
you

for

bringing

this

to

our

attention"

(paraphrased)

together with the futuristic actions for the Board and the
Crime Victims Reparations agency. Defendant made no payments
against the claimed "restitution" amount, as his bi-weekly
"NORMS statements" issued to the prison inmates showed--consistently

for

a

five-year

period,

consisting

of

approximately 120 separately issued pieces of paper given to
the inmate- - -a

11

$0. 00 restitution balance" owing for GARCIA.

See RECORD at 383-386.

[Four of NORMS statements---two at

the beginning of GARCIA'S incarceration and two at the end
thereof---were

included

as

EXHIBIT

7

to

the

Board's

Memorandum of Law in opposition to Defendant's "new trial"
motion. J
F.

The State' s

characterization
4
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[p.

6 J of the Board's

..,)

"order"
~

(purportedly arising

misleading

when

not

from

the October

distinguished

from

the

2010)

is

"ORDER

OF

RESTITUTION", actually "made" (statutory term) 24 September
2013 and filed with the District Court.
vl,

G.

The

State's

characterization

(i.e.

"Not

until

his

sentence expired and the Board requested the Third District
Court to enter the order on its docket as a civil judgment,
~

R. 194-95, did defendant attempt to challenge it." Page 6,
line 11)

is similarly misleading. The words "the order",

ostensibly referring to the Board's October 2010 decision,
·v;)

is not the "ORDER OF RESTITUTION" actually "made" and filed
with the District Court. The "ORDER OF RESTITUTION" was not
"requested" to be entered; in that narrow setting, the Board

·~

was compliant with the underlying statute. Defendant---on 8
November 2013:
judgment"

~

a mere 29 days after entry of the "civil

(State's

terminology:

page

line

12)---

thereafter filed his "set aside" motion. RECORD at 122-148.
H.

The State asserts that the Board's "amended order",

asserted to be made "three days later"
vi}

6,

been October 10,

2010,

(which would have

but which was actually six days

later: October 13th) made "no substantive changes" to the
earlier order. Incorrect, as can be verified by a comparison
vj)

thereof. See RECORD at Pages 188 and 190. The "corrected"
document

(13

October

2010,

entitled

"HEARING

OFFICER

RESULTS") does not specifically identify the $7,000 amount,
1.(/f)

which the "INITIAL HEARING" document did; the "corrected"
document

certainly

wouldn't

facially

5
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stand

to

be

a

"restitution order".
I.

The State asserts

[page 8,

footnote]

that the Utah

Supreme Court's Laycock decision was rendered before the
Restitution Act statute [77-38a-101 et seq] contained the
"within one year after sentencing" requirement. The State is
incorrect.

The

"within

one

year

after

sentencing"

requirement was adopted by the Legislature in 200s , pursuant
to

Senate

Bill

94

"Restitution

Amendments",

and

was

effective in May 2005. Laycock was issued in 2009.
The

enumeration

of

the

foregoing

"corrections"

to

the

State's "factual" assertions should not be construed as the
complete listing of the State's errors; there are numerous
other errors of lesser substantive significance which are
not herein identified.
APPELLANT'S CLARIFICATION OF THE PARTIES AND ISSUES
"ON APPEAL"
A.

Parties "on appeal"
The State intentionally mischaracterizes the "parties"

to this appeal in failing to designate the UTAH BOARD OF
PARDONS AND PAROLE [hereinafter "the Board"] and the UTAH
OFFICE

OF

petitioned

DEBT COLLECTION---each
(on 13 January 2014)

voluntary intervention"
parties-in-interest")

into

whom affirmatively

the District Court "for

the

through

of

case as

their

claimed

assigned

"real

counsel

(Assistant Attorney General Sharel s Reber for the Board and
Assistant Attorney General Amanda Jex for Debt Collection).
The two Assistant Attorneys General filed---separately, on
6
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materials

in

distinct

their

for

occasion,

the

case,

beginning

11

clients 11 ---voluminous

in

February 2014.

In

contrast, the "State of Utah 11 ---acting ostensibly through
and represented by the Salt Lake County District Attorney- - as

II

Plaintiff II in the case made no response and made no

arguments nor submitted any materials.
If now---as the BRIEF OF APPELLEE facially implies--that the "State of Utah" is the singular

11

appellee" in the

appeal, then the Court should disregard the entirety of the
State's arguments which are thus raised by it (the State)
"for the first time on appeal".
Issues "on appeal"
The State asserts

[page 2 of its BRIEF OF APPELLEE]

that only the "no jurisdiction'' issue is before the Court
11

on

appeal 11

•

Incorrect.

All

appealed

issues,

properly

"preserved" and identified within APPELLANT 1 S BRIEF,
before

the Court

of Appeals

II

on appeal"

are

and should be

decided substantively, regardless of the District Court's
refusal

to

rule

thereon

and

the

State 1 s

intentional,

tactical decision in failing to "brief II any rebuttal or
discussion thereto.
APPELLANT'S REPLY ARGUMENT
I

THE DISTRICT COURT DOES HAVE "JURISDICTION"
TO "SET ASIDE" THE "CIVIL JUDGMENT" ENTERED
BY REASON OF THE FILING OF THE BOARD-PREPARED
24 SEPTEMBER 2013 "ORDER OF RESTITUTION"
In

its

misguided

attempt
7
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to

justify

its

patently

improper "restitution order", the State confuses the issue
by failing to recognize the obvious distinction between
Court-ordered

"restitution"

as

part

of

the

criminal

sentencing process (as identified in the Restitution Act,
Section 77-38a-101 et seq) and Board-ordered "restitution"
identified and authorized by Section 77-27-6(4), including
the District Court's
State

utilizes

"civil judgment"

terminology

[page

role therein.

7,

line

SJ

such

The
as

"reopening the criminal case for substantive challenges",
which

merely

conceptual

State's

the

confirms

misunderstanding as how this all works. The Court should not
fall into the same "trap".
The provisions of Subsection 77-27-6(4)
State acknowledges

[page 2,

last

"determinative"]---controlling

line:

and

are---as the

State's term is

dispositive.

The

provisions of Section 77-38a-302(5) (d)---establishing the
"within one year after sentencing" requirement for Courtordered restitution as

part of

the

criminal

sentencing

process---are fundamentally inapplicable to Board-ordered
"res ti tut ion II and the District Court's "civil judgment" role
therein.
Quietly

buried

past

the

mid-point

of

its

"lost

jurisdiction" argument, the State acknowledges [p. 9, line
6 of its BRIEF OF APPELLEE] that
•••
Utah's district courts possess jurisdiction
over all civil and criminal matters not excluded
by Utah constitution or prohibited by law . . . 11
11

As authority for this statement, the State references to
8
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Section 78A-5-102, Utah Code. Section 78A-5-102---which is
but one of many statutory and constitutional provisions
cited in APPELLANT'S BRIEF and which numerous provisions
will not be recited here---provides in relevant part:
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction
in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in
the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
Emphasis

added.

This

statute

[78A-5-102 (1)]

is

not

the

initial "starting place" for "jurisdiction"; Article VIII,
Section 5 of

the Utah Constitution is,

by providing in

relevant part:
The
district
court
shall
have
original
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by
this constitution or by statute,
The State's "no jurisdiction"

(or "jurisdiction has been

divested") argument is not based---to the understanding of
Appellant

undersigned

GARCIA'S

"constitutional"

argument.

counsel---upon

Thus,

at

a

least

for

"constitutional" analysis, the District Court's "original
jurisdiction
11

in

all

matters"

(emphasis

added)

must

be

limited by statute".
Section 78A-5-102(1),

adopted pursuant Section 5 of

Article VIII, utilizes slightly different language: to the
phrase "in all matters" is added the qualifying "civil and
criminal"

as

well

as

the

wording

"prohibited

{statute) is substituted for the phrase "limited

by

law"
. by

statute" {constitution).
Rather than deserving the State's casual,
9
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in passing

mention, Section 78A-5-102 ought to be the "starting point"
for any analysis of the District Court's "jurisdiction".
Section 78A-5-102(1) expressly recognizes, if not actually
grants, the District Court's "original jurisdiction in all
matters civil and criminal . . . "; the phrase "jurisdiction

in all matters civil and criminal" certainly must include
the "jurisdiction" to "enter" the "civil judgment" arising
from the filing of the Board-prepared "restitution order",
filed with the District Court in apparent compliance with
Section 77-27-6

(4) .

The State follows its assertion (of "lost jurisdiction"
page

7]

admission

by

persisting

in

claiming

"that

jurisdiction has been lost- - -as has happened here" [page 9,
line

8],

so

that

the

court

"may nevertheless

lack

the

authority to proceed" [page 9, line 9]. Emphasis added. Note
the State's usage of the word "authority" when we ought to
be

talking

about

11

jurisdiction 11

;

although

the

terms

"jurisdiction" and "authority" might be considered to be
conceptually synonymous,
"authority"
statement

the State's

usage

of

the word

does tend to confuse the issue.

The State's

("lacks the authority to proceed")

is absurd.

Either the District Court has "jurisdiction" or it doesn't.
The State bases its "lost jurisdiction" argument upon
this Court's decision in the case of State vs Montoya, 825
P.2d 676 (Utah Court of Appeals 1991), and the provisions of
the

Restitution

Act

[Subsection

77-38a-302

pertaining to "within one year of sentencing".
10
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(5)

(d) J,

is

Montoya

relied upon as

"authority"

for

State's

assertions by reason of a for a single sentence contained
therein, paraphrased thus: "Upon sentencing, the court loses
jurisdiction.

No

11

additional

explanation of

Montoya

is

advanced.
The State's reference to the statute [Restitution Act,
Subsection

7 7 - 3 8 a - 3 O2 ( 5 ) ( d)

[ "within

one

year

after

sentencing"] totally eviscerates the Montoya-based "loses
jurisdiction" argument. The statute expressly recognizes the
District Court' s

II

jurisdiction" - - -to

II

order" res ti tut ion as

part of its sentencing powers over the criminal defendant--to extend past sentencing. Either Montoya doesn't mean---at
least

in this narrow context- - -what the State says the

decision means, or the Legislature has ignored the quoted
verbiage with the result that the District Court does have
post-sentencing "jurisdiction".
Subsection 77-38a-302(5) (d) of the Restitution Act--the so-called "within one year after sentencing" provision--has absolutely no bearing on the "jurisdictional" issue.
:~

The "within one year after sentencing" is a limitation upon
the District Court's ability to "order" the imposition of
"restitution"

as

part

of

its

criminal

sentence

for

a

convicted defendant.
Contrary to the State's argument (that 77-38a-302 (5) (d)
is

controlling

or

"determinative"),

the

provisions

of

Subsection 77-27-6 ( 4) - - -THE precise statute which authorizes
the Board to file its "restitution order" with the District
11
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Court to create and acquire the specific "civil judgment" at
issue in this case---are controlling.
The

State's

interpretation

would

provisions of Section 77-27-6(4):

emasculate

the

the very statute upon

which it must rely to obtain the "civil judgment". Such an
absurd result cannot be condoned.
starting

The

for

point

Court's

District

the

"jurisdiction" is the statutes and constitutional provisions
previously cited. Those provisions are supplemented further
by the provisions of STATUTE under which this
11

specific

appeal" ( ala District Court entry of a "civil judgment II by

reason of the Board-ordered "restitution")
court,

namely

affirmatively
APPELLEE]

Section

77-27-6(4).

characterizes

Subsection

[page

77-27-6 (4)

to

is before the

Indeed,
2

of
be

its

the

State

BRIEF

OF

"determinative".

Subsection 77-27-6(4) provides in its entirety (not merely
the last sentence thereof, as quoted by the State in other
portions of its BRIEF):
(4) If
the
defendant,
upon
termination or
expiration of the sentence owes outstanding fines,
restitution, or other assessed costs, or if the
board makes an order of restitution within 60 days
after termination or expiration of sentence, the
matter shall be referred to the district court for
civil collection remedies.
The Board of Pardons
and Parole shall forward a restitution order to
the sentencing court to be entered on the judgment
docket. The entry shall constite a lien and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money
in a civil judgment.
Emphasis added.
It is unfortunate that the legislatively-chosen word
12
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lien 11

somewhat

is

problematic

(but

not

fatally

dispositive), as there is---in the described situation---no
11

res" (undersigned's terminology) against which the

11

lien 11

would attach and become "enforceable". See, for example,
statutory

"mechanic's

improvements

or

lien II

repairs)

against
or

real property

personal

property

(for
(auto

repairs), lessor's lien (against personal property kept on
rented or leased premises), "hospital liens" (for insurance
company payments perhaps made directly to patient),
11

and

attorney's lien" for portions of received settlements or

awards. That the intention of the statute (77-27-6 (4)] is to
create a "civil judgment" (statutory term and utilized by
the undersigned to describe the essence of what was intended
and has actually happened), is recognized by all. The State
has

even initiated collection activities

(i.e.

11

demand

letters" to Defendant and his counsel to pay the judgment)
thereon.
In compliance with the provisions of Subsection 77-276 (4) ---but not necessarily in compliance with 77-27-6 (2) (c)
[

11

•••

board shall make all orders of restitution within 60

days after the termination or expiration of the defendant's
sentence"] or with Section 77-27-5 (1) (c)

["No restitution

may be ordered . . . except after a full hearing . . . ] and
other statutes identified herein- - -the Board "forwarded" its
24 September 2013 "ORDER OF RESTITUTION to the District
Court. RECORD at 119.
It was this "ORDER OF RESTITUTION", filed and entered
13
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about 10 October 2013, which the Defendant GARCIA promptly
[8 November 2013: 29 days following its entry] sought to set
aside.

[The State is seemingly critical of the timing (or

claimed

lateness)

of

Defendant's

challenge.

Such

is

disingenuous. Until the Board filed its "restitution order",
there was nothing to challenge.] The Board made no attempt
to "file" with the District Court either of the two October
2010 Parole Board documents ["INITIAL HEARING" and "HEARING
OFFICER RESULTS"] as a "restitution order".
There is nothing within the expressed provisions of
Subsection 77-27-6(4) which indicates a legislative intent
that the District Court has somehow been

"divested"

of

"jurisdiction", most specifically "jurisdiction" to "set
aside"

the

previously

resultant

"civil

judgment"

the

"entered" against the Defendant,

court

has

as per the

statute.
The State makes no attempt to frame, analyze or respond
to this issue. The State simplistically cites to Montoya
(for authority for its "loses jurisdiction" claim) and the
Restitution

Act

(which

implicitly

if

not

explicitly

undermines the "loses jurisdiction" statement of Montoya).
The Restitution Act itself is generally inapplicable to the
situation-at-hand,
"restitution",

as this case simply does not involve

"court-ordered" as part of the sentencing

process.
There

is

nothing

in

the

State's

argument

which

indicates or supports a claim of legislative intention to
14
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"divest"

the

District

Court

of

"jurisdiction".

On

the

contrary, the statute [77-27-6(4)] is quite explicit in its
terminology:
1.
The second sentence thereof states "The Board
of Pardons and Parole shall forward a restitution
order to the sentencing court to be entered on the
judgment docket." Emphasis added.
2.
The third sentence is even more explicit, by
providing: "The entry shall constitute a lien and
is subject to the same rules as a judgment for
money in a civil judgment." Emphasis added.

Obviously, the Legislature thought the District Court had
"jurisdiction" enough to "enter" the equivalent of a "civil
judgment". Indeed, the Board's own "ORDER OF RESTITUTION"
facially recognizes this concept, by stating (even in boldface type distinguishable from other parts thereof):
When entered on the Courts Docket, this Order
shall constitute a lien against the Defendant and
its subject to the Rules that apply in any Civil
Judgment.
Emphasis added. RECORD at 119.
The State's arguments premised upon the "within one
year after sentencing" provision
Statute,

applicable

to

the

[within the Restitution

sentencing

court

imposing

restitution as part of the criminal sentence] are unavailing
in this situation.
Assuming---only
fundamental
"divested")

for

the

functionality

of

sake
the

jurisdiction" argument,

of

argument---the

State's

"lost

(or

the Legislature must

nevertheless be deemed to have rejected the substantive
concepts upon which the argument
15
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is based.

In enacting

Subsection 77-27-6 (4), the Legislature either (1) implicitly
granted to the District Court the necessary "jurisdiction"
to "enter" the "civil judgment" based upon the filing of the
Board-prepared
recognized

"restitution

order",

previously- existing

District Court never "lost"

or

(2)

"jurisdiction"

expressly
which

the

(as the State claims).

In enacting Subsection 77-27-6(4), the Legislature was
aware that the statute's provisions would be applicable only

11

Board-ordered

involving

situations

in

restitution".FOOTNOTE 1 The Legislature was further aware

that

Board

would

have

its

"jurisdiction"

(to

order

"restitution")---albeit arguably only after expiration of
the "within one year" rule---pursuant to Subsection 77-276 (2),

which expressly "ties in into"

302 (5) (d) (ii)

of

provisions

77-27-6 (4)

of

the

Restitution
are

Subsection 77-38a-

Act.

controlling,

[ In

fact,

the

even without

regard to the "within one year" rule, were the Board to act
in apparent conflict with the implied time-restrictions of
the

11

rule 11

.]

That the Legislature was aware that ••sentencing" was
complete is evidenced not only by the "history" of any given
"case"

(for Board-ordered "restitution"), but also by the

express statutory directive followed in this very case, as
described in the second sentence Subsection 77-27-6(4):
1

Section 77-27-6,
as well as other "restitution"
statutes, were simultaneously "amended 11 pursuant to Senate
Bill 94, passed by the 2005 Legislature. See later discussion
beginning at page 21, herein.
16
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The Board of Pardons and Parole shall forward a
restitution order to the sentencing court to be
entered on the judgment docket.
Emphasis added. In light of the

11

to the sentencing court"

text, the State's contrived "lost jurisdiction" argument has
been either ignored or rejected by the Legislature. Were the
State's "lost jurisdiction" argument to be followed,
District Court would have had no "jurisdiction" to
the

sought-for

"civil

judgment".

The

11

the

enter 11

Legislature

has

recognized the District Court's "jurisdiction" to deal in
this matter; so should the Court of Appeals.
The Legislature has expressly stated its intention that
there was certainly enough "jurisdiction" to "enter" the
"civil

judgment".

That

intention

also

identified

"jurisdiction" for court action and proceedings "subject to
the same rules as a money judgment in a civil judgment".
Emphasis added. Those proceedings---by way of illustration
only and not by way of limitation- - -might be "garnishments"
or

"executions 11

,

so

as

to

make

the

II

civil

judgment 11

meaningful and enforceable.
Except for recognizing [p. 9 of BRIEF OF APPELLEE] the
district court's "jurisdiction II under a single statute [i.e.
Section

78A-5-102]

constitutional

of

the

provisions

several

pertaining

to

statutes
district

and
court

"jurisdiction" identified and analyzed in APPELLANT'S BRIEF,
the State has made no attempt to rebut or even analyze the
inapplicability of those numerous provisions and/or to find
fault with Defendant's analysis thereof. Likewise, the State
17
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has made no effort to show how the "divested" argument works
against the express grants of

11

jurisdiction 11 pursuant to the

referenced statutes. The State's superficial effort---in the
face

of

Appellant's

obvious

showing---can

be

neither

countenanced nor rewarded.
The foregoing having been observed and said, there is
no indication that the Legislature-recognized "jurisdiction"
somehow vanishes

and disappears,

immediately after

the

"entry" of the resultant "civil judgment", never again to
reappear or be exercised. Such an absurd result is, however,
the

essence

and

result

of

the

State's

illogical,

unsupported, fanciful argument and its conclusions.
Additionally, there is a certain "estoppel II argument in
opposition to the State's

"lost jurisdiction"

argument,

arising from the Board's actions which brought all of this
about: the State
obtain the

11

(or the Board)

cannot actively seek and

civil judgment" against Defendant GARCIA, thus

implicitly recognizing there was

II

jurisdiction"

for the

District Court to enter the same, but simultaneously claim
that moments

later the

"jurisdiction"

somehow vanishes,

never again to be utilized.
Likewise, the Board's "no jurisdiction" argument rings
very hollow and illusory, given the Board's own "restitution
order"---THE "restitution order" which was actually "filed"
and which started this

whole

"case" - - -was not

facially

compliant with controlling statute: namely, Subsection 7727-6(2) (c)

[".

.

the board shall make all orders of
18
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restitution within 60 days after termination or expiration

of the defendant's sentence." Emphasis added.], which was
GARCIA' s original claim to "set aside" the "civil judgment".
[The Board had argued the October 2010 "INITIAL HEARING" and
"HEARING OFFICER RESULTS" were "restitution orders". If they
were, why were not such "orders" filed with the District
Court? If they were, why was there a need to create (i.e.
"make") and thereafter file the 24 September 2013 "ORDER OF
RESTITUTION? The statute says "shall make all orders.
within

60

mandatory,

days.

"

The

word

not permissive.

"shall"

The word

11

is

binding and

all 11 means ALL,

no

exceptions; especially for THE "restitution order" intended
to have legal effect by reason of its "filing" with the
"sentencing court".]
The District Court's "jurisdiction" - - -even pre-existing
jurisdiction---to enter a
validly

invoked

relevant

except

statutes.

"civil judgment"

in

strict

Similarly,

ought not be

compliance

that

any

with

Board

the

action

purporting to order "restitution" in this case would be an
"ultra

vires"

act---with

State's claim for

II

the

same

result---because

the

funeral expenses" was time-barred by the

78B-2-304(2) 2-year statute of limitation.
B

The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the case of
The State of Utah vs Claudia Laycock, District Judge, 2009

UT 53, 214 P.3d 104 (Utah Supreme Court 2009) was originally
raised (at the 24 March 2014 oral argument hearing but not
19
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in

her

written

brief

submitted

the

month

earlier)

by

Intervenor and "real-party-in-interest" State Office of Debt
Collection through its counsel Assistant Attorney General
Amanda Jex). Her stated principal purpose in citing Laycock
was that the signed "RELEASE"

(June 2008) would and should

have no effect upon the District Court's determination of
11

complete restitution". [At that juncture, that was not what

the District Court was doing:
Board-ordered restitution.]

we are here talking about

While such may have been the

"theoretical" underpinning of things, the Supreme Court's
closing comments of its decision---that the RELEASE would be
effective to bar the widow's claims if enforcement of the
criminal court's "civil judgment" were attempted---renders
Laycock very significant.

In this regard,

Mrs Buckley's

signed "Release" would, could and should have significance
against the State's claims, which are now being enforced.
[Assistant AG Jex also argued that Laycock was authority
that

GARCIA'S

"set

"restitution order"

aside"
must be

claims

against

the

filed only pursuant

Board's
to the

"extraordinary writ" provisions of Rule 65B.]
Laycock involved a

fact

situation quite

similar to

GARCIA' s: death-involved driving offense, civil litigation,
and settlement. The offense was committed and the defendant
therein was sentenced in 2004, but the district court did
not get around to determining "restitution" until 2007. The
district court refused to determine "complete restitution",
and the State---unable to "appeal" from a criminal verdict-20
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- filed for

"extraordinary relief"

under Rule

6 SB in an

original proceeding in the Utah Supreme Court. The Laycock
decision---the Supreme Court's "taken" opportunity for a
"teaching moment" for all criminal court judges statewide--was finally issued in 2009.
The State states [Footnote 2 on page 8 of BRIEF] the
District Court's rejection of GARCIA' s claimed (by the State
and by the District Court,

but in error)

"reliance"

on

Laycock, ostensibly on the basis that the "restitution Act"

statute

did

sentencing"

not

contain

the

"within

one

year

after

when the Laycock decision was rendered.

State cites to pages

595 and 606

The

of the RECORD as the

District Court's duplicative statement. The State and the
District Court are both in error. The "within one year of
sentencing" was added by the 2005 Legislature, pursuant to
Senate Bill 94, which became effective in May 2005---after
the defendant in the criminal case had been sentenced [in
2004 in that case], but considerably before the Utah Supreme
Court decided Laycock [in 2009].
only

adopted

the

"within

[The 2005 legislation not

one

year

after

sentencing"

standard, but also adopted the "Board shall make all orders
of

restitution

within

60

days

after

termination

or

expiration of sentence" text contained in Subsection 77-276 (4) (2) (c)

as

well

contained

in

Subsection

provisions,

adopted

as

that

essentially

77-27- 6 (4) .

pursuant

to

the

verbatim
These

same

text

material

legislative

"amendment" enacted in 2005, should not be construed in a
21
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manner to create conflict within themselves.]
The significance of Laycock,

however,

is not in its

approved "timing" of things. Rather, Laycock---recognizing
if

not

mandating

Court-ordered

"restitution"

extending

presumptively three years [2004 to 2007] and/or five years
[2004

to

2009

or

later]

after

conviction---totally

emasculates the "lost jurisdiction" arguments claimed to
arise under Montoya, even in the absence of the "within one
year after sentencing" statutory text.
C

The

State

argues

the

District

Court

has

no

"jurisdiction" to "go behind" the Board's filed "restitution
order". The statutory invalidity is obvious from the face of
the document itself. Attributing a "personal" knowledge to
Judge Skanchy (had the Board-prepared "ORDER OF RESTITUTION"
of 24 September 2013 been first presented to him in lieu of
the "automatic" entry thereof), the following issues would
have been facially obvious:
1.
The 24 September 2013- "made 11 ( statutory term) was
statutorily defective, as being "late", as not being
"made within 60 days of expiration of sentence". [Judge
Skanchy would have known Defendant GARCIA was sentenced
to a "five year" sentence of incarceration, commencing
mid-April 2008. The Board-prepared ORDER OF RESTITUTION
was facially "late".]
2.
Any Board-prepared and -filed "restitution
order" for "funeral expenses" would be an "ultra
vires" act (by the Board), as 2-year "statute of
limitation" (as per Section 78B-2-304 (2), Utah
Code) had expired (in March 2008), even prior to
Defendant's June 2008 sentencing, at which time
the Parole Board first acquired "jurisdiction"
over the Defendant. Thus, the Board-prepared ORDER
OF RESTITUTION was facially invalid, as the Board
22
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had not authority to enter the order.]
In addition to the "facial"

invalidities of the Board's

"filed" ORDER OF RESTITUTION, there are a number of related
"facts"

(and,

non-events

specifically,

critical

and

dispositive for "statute of limitation" reasons) of which
the

District

Court

was

II

institutionally"

aware,

as

of

October 2013 when the Board's ORDER was presented for filing
and "civil judgment":
3.
Mrs Gail Buckley, as "personal representative 11
of the Estate of Shane Buckley, Deceased and in
her own name timely-filed (in February 2008) her
own "wrongful death" lawsuit against Defendant
Dennis J Garcia, in which she claimed inter alia
damages for "funeral expenses".
4.
The
"Buckley
wrongful
death"
lawsuit
identified only Mrs Buckley as a plaintiff and did
not identify nor include the State Off ice for
Victims of Crime as a party nor mention any
payment made to her.
II
5.
The
Buckley
wrongful
death"
lawsuit,
responded to (ala formally "answered") by GARCIA
through counsel, was "dismissed" in August 2008,
pursuant
to
joint
motion
of
the
parties,
implicitly indicating a "settlement".

6.
The State Office for Victims of Crime (or its
successor agency) filed no "wrongful death" claim,
at any time, against GARCIA, under a "subrogation"
theory, for "funeral expenses".
That

the

State

(and/or

the

Board,

through

Appellee's

appellate counsel) argues that the District Court has "no
jurisdiction" to look "behind" the Board's "ORDER" is, for
essentially the same reasons and constitutional "logic", why
the "no judicial review of Board decisions" statute [77-275 (3), Utah Code] is unconstitutional, as violative of the
"open courts" provision of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah
23
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Constitution. The District Court, as a matter of law, does
have "jurisdiction" to look "behind" the filed ORDER to
ascertain the underlying validity of the "order" and its
resulting "civil judgment".
controlling

The

statute

recognizes the District Court's

expressly

[77-27-6 (4)]
11

jurisdiction 11 ---even "pre-

existing jurisdiction"---to "enter" the "civil judgment".
The statute states:
The entry [of the Board's restitution order] shall
constitute a lien and is subject to the same rules
as a judgment for money in a civil judgment.
Emphasis

added.

Bracketed

text

added

for

clarity.

The

highlighted text confirms the applicability of the Rules [of
Civil Procedure]

to the situation. Arguably, most of the

"rules" would be applicable. While not expressly stated, the
rules pertaining to a ''money judgment"---i.e. those rules
pertaining to "attachment" [Rule 64B], "garnishment" [Rule
64D] and "execution 11

[Rule 64E] , as well as "supplemental

proceedings" so as to identify the debtor's assets to be
subject to garnishment, attachment or execution.
Presumptively,
"jurisdiction"

to

the

District

hear

that

the

would

defendant-initiated

concerning the amount of accruing
claims

Court

"judgment"

II

have

matters

interest" as well as

may have been

"paid"

or is

somehow barred by passage of time beyond 8 years after entry
and/or

may be

barred by

a

discharge

in bankruptcy or

mitigated by "accord and satisfaction" principles.
It is amazing that for all of those "examples" of post24
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sentencing involvement

"jurisdiction"

exists

to enforce

and/or aid in the collection of the "civil judgment" so
created and entered;

nevertheless the State persists to

argue there is no "jurisdiction" for the District Court to
"set aside" that same "judgment".
The Court of Appeals should not mistakenly succumb to
the State's misguided arguments.
D

The State argues
Court

would

empowers
claims.

11

have

that

[page 9,

line 5]

"jurisdiction

court

to

under

consider

that the District
Rule

65B,

[Garcia's]

which

substantive

Bracketed word substituted for clarity. Rule 65B

does not grant "jurisdiction" to the District Court; Rule
65B merely identifies a

specialized remedy available in

specialized circumstances
speedy and adequate

[i.e.

remedy

is

"Where

no

available,

petition the court for extraordinary relief
65B (a)]

wherein the Court might

other plain,
a

person may
.

" Rule

otherwise already have

"jurisdiction".
If there is "jurisdiction" for the District Court to
act in response to a petition filed seeking Rule 65B relief
and remedy, there is "jurisdiction" for the District Court
to act to "set aside" the "civil judgment" under Rule 60 (b).
That the Defendant was no longer in the custody (or
"jurisdiction")

of

the

Board

of

Pardons

is

further

problematic for everyone. Likewise, it is the District Court
"civil judgment" which is ultimately at issue.
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GARCIA's

timely, specific Rule 60 (b)

11

set aside" motion, in a case in

which the Board and the other

11

real-party-in-interest 11 have

intervened, is sufficient to do what is necessary.
II
THE 5 OCTOBER 2010 "INITIAL HEARING"
WAS NOT THE STATUTORILY-REQUIRED "FULL HEARING"
AS A NECESSARY PREREQUISITE TO BOARD-ORDERED RESTITUTION
While not expressly framing a responsive "argument" on
this issue,
"statement
APPELLEE]

the State goes to great
of

relevant

facts"

[page

lengths within its
5 of

its

BRIEF OF

to seemingly claim and argue that the 5 October

2010 "initial hearing" was the statutorily-required "full
hearing" identified and argued by GARCIA. As shown below,
the State's brief description of the "hearing" as well as
the State's quotation of GARCIA'S "I think we've covered it"
remark is misleading and, for that reason, patently false.
During

the

entirety of

the

proceedings

before

the

District Court, the Board submitted no documentation to even
hint that "restitution" was "on-the-table" for consideration
(of imposition against GARCIA) at the October 2010 hearing.
The concept of any "restitution" was brought up---and then
only at end,

and then only in passing. During the entire

hearing, the word "restitution" was mentioned but a single
time.
As an "exhibit" attached to its "opposition" memorandum
of law filed in February 2014, the Board submitted the 7page "transcript" of the October 2010

11

hearing 11 ---the so-

called "initial hearing" generally afforded all prisoners
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under Board "jurisdiction" at the State Prison. See RECORD
at 180-186. Pages 6 and 7---which are attached as ADDENDUM
1 to this APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF---are quoted, thus (with
hand-written annotation by the undersigned):
HEARING OFFICER: . . . that, what do you want to
do with the rest of your time?
GARCIA:
People have been know to stay there. Um,
I did get satisfaction from helping others that
are struggling like I was when I got there, but at
the same time, I feel like I'm at the peak of my
recovery and I've worked too hard to lose anything
I've gained from that program, so going somewhere
else might not be a bad option. I was thinking
Lone Peak to kind of a maybe get me ready as far
as work and ah, stuff like that.
HEARING OFFICER:
Okay. Ah, um, I'm sure the
possibility as crossed your mind that you might do
all
five
years
for
this,
what
the
legal
consideration is that you, you were reckless and
careless and so that's why you were sentenced the
way you were, you didn't get Manslaughter which
carries a one to fifteen year sentence and I think
you were probably appropriately sentenced, but I
think the Board will consider the possibility of
having you do all five years. What I do is make a
recommendation and I'm not sure what that's going
to be so I'm going to take your case under
advisement today, ah, and I just that um, to maybe
just prepare your mind, um, for that possibility,
but
I'm sure they will also consider the
possibility of paroling you at some point too,
you're about half way through with your sentence
so there still remains the possibility that
they'll let you out some time in the next thirty
months and have you serve the remainder of your
time on parole. If they were to do that, I'm sure
they would order you to continue in some kind of
substance abuse aftercare and have interlocking
device on your vehicle, pay restitution, I know
there's seven thousand dollars was paid by a state
agency for the funeral costs, and of course no
alcohol. Um, so when you get out of here, whether
that' s on parole or having [page break here]
served all five years, what do you plan to do?
GARCIA:
Well, my plans (inaudible) I plan to seek
further education. My parents are deaf, I know
27
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sign language. There is a course out there
designed kinda for people like me that knows sign
language that need advanced training to get
certified. I was thinking about pursuing that. I
also have a couple other options that I could
probably pretty much jump right into. I do want to
take advantage of resources that are out there for
me to get an education to help me out with the
certification.
HEARING OFFICER:
Okay. Alright, is there anything
else you'd like to talk about?
GARCIA: Not that I could think of, I think we've
covered it.
HEARING OFFICER:
Okay,
well
I've
kind
of
explained the way the process works. I'll finish
writing a report. I'll come to a recommendation
that I'll give that report along with your whole
file to the five member Board. They make the final
decision and that normally takes two or three
weeks, okay?
GARCIA:

Okay.

HEARING OFFICER:
GARCIA:

Alright, I wish you well.

Thank you very much.

Emphasis added. RECORD at 185-186. ADDENDUM 1 hereto.
As

shown

above,

the

singular

reference

to

any

"restitution" was in the conditional context of GARCIA'S
being

released

"on

parole".

The

Hearing

Officer

made

absolutely no inquiry as to whether GARCIA had an objections
or "defenses" thereto.
The Hearing Officer made no indication that the Board
would be considering "restitution"

or that he would be

"recommending"

Officer's

it.

The

Hearing

statement

containing the "restitution" remark consisted of at least
four rambling, "run-on sentences" covering a wide range of
topics and issues,

for 250 words.
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The Hearing Officer's

question following the "restitution" remark was:
HEARING OFFICER: . . . Um, so when you get out of
here, whether that's on parole or having served
all five years, what do you plan to do?
Hearing Transcript, pp. 6-7; RECORD at 185-186; ADDENDUM #1,
hereto.
The actual "word count" for the "initial hearing" is--excluding the frequent "um" and similar sounds---is 1902
words. The above-referenced "restitution" remark, together
with the "$7,000 paid by the state agency"

(paraphrased)

statement of fact (or the Hearing Officer's stated awareness
thereof), totals a mere 18 words: less than one percent of
the "hearing". GARCIA was not asked about "restitution".
Such is hardly the "full hearing" the statute [Section 7727-5 (1) (c)]

requires

"before"

the

Board

may

"order

restitution".
III
ALL OTHER APPELLANT-IDENTIFIED AND PROPERLY "PRESERVED"
ISSUES FOR APPEAL SHOULD BE AUTHORITATIVELY DECIDED
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN SPITE OF APPELLEES'
INTENTIONAL FAILURE TO "BRIEF" AND RESPOND THERETO
The

Appellant's

other

identified

issues

within

APPELLANT'S BRIEF, briefly summarized as:
A.
Board-ordered "restitution" for "pecuniary
damages" ( of "funeral expenses" reimbursement) was
"ultra vires" as barred by two-year statute of
limitation of 78B-2-3 04 [Subsection 77-3 6a-102 ( 6) ,
Utah Code ("definition" of "pecuniary damages")]
B.
Board's prepared and filed "restitution order"
was untimely, as not being "made" within the
statutorily-prescribed time from of "within 60
days of expiration of sentence" [Subsection 77-276 (2) (c)].

C.

Section 77-27-5(3), Utah Code ["no judicial
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review
of
Board
restitution
decisions 11
(paraphrased)] is unconstitutional, as violative
of the "open courts" prescription of Article I,
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
were each properly and timely presented to the District
Court and have been thus "preserved for appeal 11

The issues

•

should be decided authoritatively by the Utah Court of
Appeals, notwithstanding the intentional refusal to do so by
the District Court (whose "legal" decision would have been
given no deference in any case) and the State's calculated,
tactical decision to intentionally refrain from responding
to such issues.
CONCLUSION
The District Court, pursuant to constitutionally and
statutorily-recognized

"grants"

of

jurisdiction,

has

"jurisdiction" to not only enter the Board's "restitution
order", but to set aside the resulting "civil judgment". The
State's claim that Montoya (1991) and/or the provisions of
Subsection 7 7 - 3 8 a - 3 O2 ( 5 ) ( d)

[pertaining to the

II

within one

year after sentencing", which is expressly applicable to
Court-ordered restitution undertaken at sentencing, as part
of the criminal case]

are

inappropriate

to deprive

the

District Court of the "jurisdiction" clearly granted and/or
recognized by Subsection 77-27-6(4).
The

Board

consistently

claimed

in

the

proceedings

before the District Court that "no restitution hearing was
held", supposedly because (1) the Defendant had "waived the
hearing" by failing to object to the pre-sentence report
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statement, and/or (2) the Defendant had failed to "ask for"
the hearing. On appeal, the State actively "switches horses"
by

abandoning

restitution

the

hearing

Board's
was

acknowledgement

held")

and

October 2010 "initial hearing" was,

asserting

that

("no

that

the

in fact and law,

the

statutorily-required "full hearing". An examination of the
relevant oral discussion, as contained in the Board-provided
11

wri tten transcript II of that "initial hearing" evidences the

patent falsity of the State's claim. Coupled with the fact
that there was no advance "notice" that "restitution" was
going to be on-the-table for consideration and that the
Board produced no documentary evidence of such advanced
"notice 11 to GARCIA, the State's claims fail, as a matter of
law.
The Utah Court of Appeals should additionally decide
the properly preserved other issues raised by Appellant
GARCIA,

notwithstanding the District Court's intentional

refusal to rule on such issues and the State's appellate
counsel's intentional and tactical choice in refraining to
"brief" and/or otherwise respond thereto.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of June, 2015.
/s/ Stephen G Homer
STEPHEN G HOMER
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
DENNIS J GARCIA
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COUNSEL'S CERTIFICATION ["WORD COUNT" AND TYPE SIZE]
The undersigned counsel certifies that the text within the
foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF were printed in 13-point
Courier type (font) and that the "word count" for the BRIEF--exclusive of Table of Contents and captions--was 6507
words, as indicated by the "word count" subroutine of the
WordPerfect 5 .1 word-processing program with which the typed
material was created.
ls/Stephen G Homer

CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused a two copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to be hand-delivered to the office
of Mr Sean Reyes, Utah Attorney General, Ms Nancy Kemp,
Assistant Attorney General, Utah Attorney General's Off ice,
Heber Wells Building, Fifth Floor, 160 East 300 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, this 16th day of June, 2015.
ls/Stephen G Homer
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ADDENDA

1

TRANSCRIPT
Excerpts [pages 6-7]
5 October 2010 "Original Hearing"
before Board of Pardons hearing officer
RECORD at 185-186
[with hand-written notations]
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that, what do you want to do with the rest of your time?

1

2

People have been know to stay there. Um, I did get satisfaction

GARCIA:

3

from helping others that are struggling like I was when I got there,

4

but at the same time, I feel like I'm at the peak of my recovery and

5

I've worked too hard to lose anything I've gained from that

6

program, so going somewhere else might not be a bad option. I

7

was thinking Lone Peak to kind of a maybe get me ready as far as

8

work and ah, stuff like that.

9

HEARING OFFICER:

. Okay. Ah, um, I'm sure the possibility has crossed your mind that

10

you might do all five years for this, what the legal consideration is ·

11

is that you, you were reckless and careless and so that's why you

12

were sentenced the way you were, you didn't get Manslaughter

13

which carries a one to fifteen year sentence and I think you were

14

probably appropriately sentenced, but I think the Board will

15

consider the possibility of having you do all five years. What I do

16

is I make a recommendation and I'm not sure what that's going to

17

be so I'm going to take your case under advisement today, ah, and I

18

just say that um, to maybe just prepare your mind um, for that

19

possibility, but I'm sure they will also consider the possibility of

20

paroling you at some point too, you're about half way through with

21

your sentence so there still remains _that possibility too that they'll

22

let you out some time in the next thirty months and have you serve

23

the remainder of your time on parole. If they were to do that, I'm

24

sure they would order you to continue in some kind of substance

25

abuse aftercare and have an interlocking device on your vehicle,

26
27

28
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pay restitution, I know there's seven thousand dollars was aid b a

i¥J lC state agency for the funeral costs, and of course, no alcohol.
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Um,

when you get out of here, whether that's on parole or having
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1

served all five years, what do you plan to do?

Q
'

2

GARCIA:

Well, my plans (inaudible) I plan to seek further education. My

3

parents are deaf, I know sign language. There is a course out there

4

designed kinda for people like me that knows sign language that

5

need advanced training to get certified. I was thinking about

6

pursuing that. I also have a couple other options that I could

7

probably pretty much jump right into. I do want to take advantage

8

of resources that are out there for me to get an education to help me

9

out with the certification.

10

HEARING OFFICER:

Okay. Alright, is there anything else you'd like to talk about?

11

GARCIA:

Not that I could think of, I think we've covered it.

12

HEARING OFFICER:

Okay, well I've kind of explained the way the process works. I'll

L
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13

finish writing a report. I'll come to a recommendation that I'll give

14

that report along with your whole file to the five member Board.

15

They make the final decision and that nonnally talces two to three

16

weeks, okay?

17

GARCIA:

Okay.

18

HEARING OFFICER:

Alright, I wish you well.

19

GARCIA:

Thank you very much.
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